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Quantitative differences applicable to magnitudes but not to intensities, 1-4 ; Attempt to estimate intensities by objective causes or atomic movements, 4-7 ; Different kinds of intensities, 7 ; Deep-seated psychic states: desire, 8, hope, 9, joy and sorrow, 10; Aesthetic feelings, 11-18: grace, 12, beauty, 14-18, music, poetry, art, 15-18 ; Moral feelings, pity, 19; ; Conscious states involving physical symptoms, 20: muscular effort, 21-26, attention and muscular tension, 27-28 ; Violent emotions, 29-31 : rage, 29, fear, 30 ; Affective sensations, 32-39: pleasure and pain, 33-39, disgust, 36 ; Representative sensations, 39-60 : and external causes, 42, sensation of sound, 43, intensity, pitch and muscular effort, 45-6, sensations of heat and cold, 46-7, sensations of pressure and weight, 47-50, sensation of light, 50-60, photometric experiments, 52-60, Delboeuf's experiments, 56-60 ; Psychophysics, 60-72: Weber and Fechner, 61-65, Delboeuf, 67-70, the mistake of regarding sensations as magnitudes, 70-72 ; Intensity in (1) representative, (2) affective states, intensity and multiplicity, 72-74.Number and its units, 75-77, number and accompanying intuition of space, 78-85 ; Two kinds of multiplicity, of material objects and conscious states, 85-87, impenetrability of matter, 88-89, homogeneous time and pure' duration, 90-91 ; Space and its contents, 92, empirical theories of space, 93-94, intuition of empty homogeneous medium peculiar to man, 95-97, time as homogeneous medium reducible to space, 98-99 ; Duration, succession and space, 100-104, pure duration, 105-106; ; Is duration measurable ? 111-112 ; Paradox of the Eleatics, 113-115 ; Duration and simultaneity, 115-116 ; Velocity and simultaneity, 117-119 ; Space alone homogeneous, duration and succession belong to conscious mind, 120-121 ; Two kinds of multiplicity, qualitative and quantitative, 121-123, superficial psychic states invested with discontinuity of their external causes, 124-126, these eliminated, real duration is felt as a quality, 127-128 ; The two aspects of the self, on the surface well-defined conscious states, deeper down states which interpenetrate and form organic whole, 129-139, solidifying influence of language on sensation, 129-132, analysis distorts the feelings, 132-134, deeper conscious states forming a part of ourselves, 134-136 ; Problems soluble only by recourse to the concrete and living self, 137-139.Dynamism and mechanism, 140-142 ; Two kinds of determinism, 142 ; Physical determinism, 143-155 : and molecular theory of matter, 143, and conservation of energy, 144, if conservation universal, physiological and nervous phenomena necessitated, but perhaps not conscious states, 145-148, but is principle of con conversation universal ?
Now you give up this compromise without the least scruple when you study external things, since you then leave aside the forces themselves, assuming that they exist, and consider only their measurable and extended effects.
Why, then, do you keep to this hybrid concept when you analyse in its turn the state of consciousness ?
172-175, geometrical representation of process of coming to a decision, 175-178, the fallacies to which it leads determinists and libertarians, 179-183 ; Real duration and prediction, 183-198 : conditions of Paul's prediction of Peter's action (I) being Peter (2) knowing already his final act, 184-18g, the three fallacies involved, 190-192, astronomical prediction depends on hypothetical acceleration of movements, 193-195, duration cannot be thus accelerated, 196-198 ; Real duration and causality, 199-221 : the law " same antecedents, same consequents," 199-201, causality as regular succession, 202-203, causality as prefiguring : two kinds (1) prefiguring as mathematical pre-existence ; implies non-duration, but we endure and therefore may be free, 204-210, (2) prefiguring as having idea of future act to be realized by effort; does not involve determinism, 211-214, determinism results from confusing these two senses, 215-218 ; Freedom real but indefinable, 219-221.
States of self perceived through forms borrowed from external world, 223 ; Intensity as quality, 225 ; Duration as qualitative multiplicity, 226 ; No duration in the external world, 227 ; Extensity and duration must be separated, 229 ; Only the fundamental self free, 231 ; ]Kant's mistaken idea of time as homogeneous, 232, hence he put the self which is free outside both space and time, 233 ; Duration is heterogeneous, relation of psychic state to act is unique, and act is free, 235-240.
Examining the first of these ideas, we found, that psychic phenomena were in themselves pure quality or qualitative multiplicity, and that, on the other hand, their cause situated in space was quantity.
In so far as this quality becomes the sign of the quantity and we suspect the presence of the latter behind the former, we call it intensity.The intensity of a simple state, therefore, is not quantity but its qualitative sign.You will find that it arises from a compromise between (225) pure quality, which is the state of consciousness, and pure quantity, which is necessarily space.In a word, the moments of inner duration are not external to one another. The present only, or, if we prefer the expression, simultaneity.No doubt external things change, but their moments do not succeed one another, if we retain the ordinary meaning of the word, except for a consciousness which keeps them in mind.If magnitude, outside you, is never intensive, intensity, within you, is never magnitude.It is through having overlooked this that philosophers have been compelled to distinguish two kinds of quantity, the one extensive, the other intensive, without ever succeeding in explaining what they had in common or how the same words " increase " and " decrease " could be used for things so unlike.A Priori it seems fairly probable that this is what happens.For, assuming that the forms alluded to, into which we fit matter, come entirely from the mind, it seems difficult to apply them constantly to objects without the latter soon leaving a mark on them : by then using these forms to gain a knowledge of our own person we run the risk of mistaking for the colouring of the self the reflection of the frame in which we place it, i.e. But one can go further still and assert that forms applicable to things cannot be entirely our own work, that they must result from a compromise between matter and mind, that if we give much to matter we probably receive something from it, and that thus, when we try to grasp ourselves after an excursion into the external world, we no longer have our hands free.Now just as, in order to ascertain the real rela- (224) -tions of physical phenomena to one another, we abstract whatever obviously clashes with them in our way of perceiving and thinking, so, in order to view the self in its original purity, psychology ought to eliminate or correct certain forms which bear the obvious mark of the external world. When isolated from one another and regarded as so many distinct units, psychic states seem to be more or less intense.Next, looked at in their multiplicity, they unfold in time and constitute duration.